Political Populism and Financial Markets: Does Populism induce Political Uncertainty? Annual Meeting of the European Public Choice Society 2019

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#### Agenda

I. Motivation

- II. Literature
- III. Data & Methodology
- IV. Results
- V. Conclusion



#### **Populism: On the rise?**





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#### **Populism: On the rise?**

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| Why is populism on the rise? How<br>Brexit and Donald Trump gained<br>support  |           |        |
| It's not the refuge of old white male racists. Trump and Brexit have plenty<br>of young and affluent supporters, and they're here to stay. Roger Eatwell<br>and Matthew Goodwin demolish the myths peddled by comfortable elites |           |        |
|  |           |        |



#### **Populism: On the rise?**



# Quicktake The Rise of Populism

#### By Marc Champion

Updated on 22. Januar 2019, 06:28 MEZ

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When Donald Trump entered the White House as the 45th U.S. president, the leadership of the free world was placed into the hands of a <u>populist</u>. Few ideas have had as sudden a resurgence in recent years as populism, with upstart parties

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#### **Higher Inflation**





Populism and financial markets

6

#### **Political Uncertainty and Stock Market Volatility**



#### EUROPE MARKETS

### As worries about populism in Europe rise, investors bet on stock market volatility

- Amid growing concerns about populism, investors are betting on heightened political uncertainty and greater volatility in European stock markets ahead of European Parliament elections in May.
- More than 350 million EU citizens will head to the polls between May 23 and 26 to elect a new Parliament, a vote that will shape the future of the bloc amid a backlash against immigration and years of austerity.

Published 9:36 PM ET Thu, 21 March 2019

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# **Overall Research Question**

- What are the consequences of populism on
  - Political uncertainty and
  - Financial markets
  - around national elections?
- This study makes use of Kelly et al. (2016, JF) who propose a measure of (the price of) Political Uncertainty in financial markets around national elections and global summits
- We combine this measure with data on the degree of populism in these elections
- We analyze whether populism and/or its host ideology induce Political Uncertainty



#### **Political Uncertainty and Populism/Ideology**

- We show that
  - The degree of populism around national elections has a direct impact on political uncertainty
  - This result is ideologically driven by the success of left-wing populist parties, whereas the impact of right-wing populism remains more ambiguous (in the short-run dimension covered by the measure used in this study)



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### **Populism in general**

- Definitions:
  - Battle between the virtuous 'ordinary' masses and a nefarious or corrupt elite, together with left-/right-wing host ideology (Mudde, 2004, GO)
  - "The defense of the people's interest" against those of the privileged elite and anonymous market mechanisms (Müller, 2017)
- Populist rhetoric in general includes
  - High personalist focus & strong emphasis on popular sovereignty
    - → rejects external constraints per se (Müller, 2017)
  - Personification of democracy in populist leader
  - → Marginalization of democratic institutions & Reduction of executive constraints (Müller, 2017)

#### Leveraging impact of populist policies



#### Populism and its consequences

- Rode & Revuelta (2017, EG): all populist governments
  - Actively reduce economic freedom (legal security, free trade barriers, economic regulation)
  - Achieve this mainly through tax policy and size of government
    - Left-wing populism tends to increase both
    - Potentially leading to economic collapse (Bittencourt, 2012, EG; Edwards, 2010)
- BUT: Right-wing populism often implements a business-friendly rhetoric (for specific "friendly" businesses, Holcombe, 2018) (Rode & Revuelta, 2017; Müller, 2017; Mudde, 2007)
- THEREFORE:
  - Does populism have a negative impact on financial markets?
  - What role does ideology play?



### **Political Uncertainty**

- Bialkowski et al. (2008, JBF) & Boutchkova et al. (2012, RFS):
  - higher return volatility for markets/significant
  - increasing in closeness of elections and change of political orientation of government
- Kelly et al. (2016, JF):
  - higher prices of equity options spanning elections and global summits
  - increasing in weaker economies and closeness of elections
- Redl (2018, WP):
  - higher macroeconomic uncertainty (cf. Jurado et al., 2015, AER) around national elections
  - increasing in the closeness of elections (controlling for financial uncertainty)



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#### **Populism around national elections**

• We define populism in country c around election date  $\tau$  as

$$POP_{c,\tau} = \sum_{p \in P_{c,\tau}} s_{p,\tau} \cdot POP_{p,\tau}$$

where  $s_{p,c,\tau}$  and  $POP_{p,\tau}$  are the relative share of seats and the measure of populism for party p at time  $\tau$ , respectively

- We similarly define a measure of ideology ( $Prile_{c,\tau}$ )
- Data used:
  - National Elections: Based on PARLGOV (Döring and Manov, 2018) (23 countries, 60 elections) 
     Election Data Table
  - Populism and Ideology: Party manifestos analyzed by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP, Lehman et al. 2018)



#### **Populism around national elections**

- For quantitative measures of populism and ideology, most researchers employ content analysis (Hawkins, 2009; Pauwels, 2011)
- Populism:
  - Institutional-discursive approach (Mudde, 2007; Hawkins, 2009; Müller, 2017)
  - Three central components present in populist party programs: Anti-elitism, popular sovereignty and rejection of restraints on popular decisions and group identification with "the real people" (left/right)
  - Variables (e.g.): Anti-imperialism, Internationalism: negative, European Union: negative democracy,...
- Ideology:
  - Difference between left/right measures for "the real people"
  - Left: Welfare State Expansion & Labor Groups: Positive
  - Right: National Way of Life: Positive & Multiculturalism: Negative



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Details on variables

#### Populism around the most recent elections



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#### **Political Uncertainty**

• Political Uncertainty: Following Kelly et al. (2016) we measure political uncertainty around national elections  $(\overline{IVD}_{\tau})$  as

Implied Volatility  $\Delta$  (spanning election vs. before & after election)

Option Definitions Option Data Info

- → premium paid to insure against political uncertainty
- Accounts for country-specific slow moving variation of implied volatility, advancing country- and time fixed effect approach



Option Expiry Dates: Election Date: Time between election and option expiry (b-τ days): Period to calculate average UNIVERSITÄT implied volatility (20 days): LIECHTENSTEIN

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19

## **Other data (controls)**

- Closeness of election (cf. Kelly et al., 2016)
  - SEAT\_SPREAD<sub>c, $\tau$ </sub> =  $s_{\#2,\tau} s_{\#1,\tau}$  (standardized within country)
- Measures of Economic Conditions (cf. Kelly et al., 2016):
  - OECD:
    - Seasonally adjusted quarterly growth of real GDP (GDP)
    - Composite Leading Indicator (CLI)
  - IMF:
    - Most recent real GDP growth forecast (FST)
  - Datastream:
    - The previous 3-month index return (*MKT*)
  - → *GDP*, *CLI*, *FST* are standardized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation within country based on available data (1990-/1999-)



#### **Estimation methodology**

- Following Kelly et al. (2016), we:
  - establish differences in  $\overline{IVD}_{c,\tau}$  for median-splits based on
    - Economic conditions (*MKT*, *FST*, *CLI*, *GDP*)
    - Political variables (SEAT\_SPREAD, Prile, POP)
  - Report:
    - *IVD* in 1<sup>st</sup> group (weak economy, high closeness, right-wing, high populism)
    - Differences in group means and accompanying t-statistics
- To measure the impact in more detail, we regress  $\overline{IVD}_{c,\tau}$  on
  - political variables (and combinations)
  - With economic controls

[All statistics imply two-way clustered standard errors on country-year level]



21

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#### **Group Differences**

|                            |                            |                              |                            | Implied Volati            | lity Difference (          | IVD)                      |                            |                           |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
|                            | All<br>(1)                 | MKT<br>(2)                   | GDP (3)                    | FST (4)                   | CLI<br>(5)                 | Seat Spead (6)            | Right-Left Score<br>(7)    | Populism (8)              |
| Group 1 Mean               | $1.763^{***}$<br>t = 3.498 | $3.226^{***}$<br>t = 4.502   | $2.340^{***}$<br>t = 3.251 | $1.896^{**}$<br>t = 2.410 | $2.528^{***}$<br>t = 3.112 | $2.167^{**}$<br>t = 2.244 | $1.661^{***}$<br>t = 2.756 | $1.565^{**}$<br>t = 2.192 |
| Difference to Group 2 Mean |                            | $-2.439^{***}$<br>t = -3.165 | -1.154<br>t = -1.136       | -0.445<br>t = -0.478      | -1.391<br>t = -1.513       | -0.782<br>t = -0.945      | $0.236 \\ t = 0.360$       | 0.818<br>t = 1.102        |
| Observations               | 60                         | 60                           | 60                         | 57                        | 60                         | 60                        | 59                         | 59                        |

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



#### **Regression Results**

|                             |                                 |                           |                             | Implie                      | d Volatility Di                | fference (IVD)                 |                             |  |                                 |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|---------------------------------|
|                             |                                 |                           | (2)                         |                             |                                | MKT                            | MKT                         | GDP  | GDP                             |
| Constant                    | (1)<br>$1.74^{***}$<br>t = 3.78 | (2)<br>1.43**<br>t = 2.07 | (3)<br>$3.22^*$<br>t = 1.74 | (4)<br>$3.09^*$<br>t = 1.71 | (5)<br>$5.04^{**}$<br>t = 2.54 | (6)<br>$3.93^{**}$<br>t = 2.35 | (7)<br>$2.72^*$<br>t = 1.73 | $\begin{array}{c} (8) \\ 4.29^{***} \\ t = 2.78 \end{array}$ | (9)<br>$3.61^{***}$<br>t = 2.85 |
| Seat-Spread                 | $0.23 \\ t = 0.58$              |                           |                             |                             |                                |                                |                             |  |                                 |
| РОР                         |                                 | $0.04^{***}$<br>t = 4.03  |                             | $0.08^{***}$<br>t = 3.02    | $-0.20^{***}$<br>t = -3.30     | $-0.17^{*}$<br>t = -1.74       | $-0.20^{*}$<br>t = -1.86    | $-0.22^{**}$<br>t = -2.06                                    | $-0.23^{**}$<br>t = -2.30       |
| Prile                       |                                 |                           | $0.52 \\ t = 0.92$          | $0.71 \\ t = 1.19$          | $1.32^{*}$<br>t = 1.82         | $0.69 \\ t = 1.12$             | $0.54 \\ t = 1.13$          | $1.03^{**}$<br>t = 2.01                                      | $0.97^{**}$ t = 2.07            |
| POP*Prile                   |                                 |                           |                             |                             | $-0.08^{***}$<br>t = -2.88     | $-0.05^{*}$<br>t = -1.74       | $-0.06^{**}$<br>t = -2.14   | $-0.08^{**}$<br>t = -2.58                                    | $-0.08^{***}$<br>t = -2.82      |
| V5                          |                                 |                           |                             |                             |                                | $-1.77^{***}$<br>t = -4.53     | $-2.80^{***}$<br>t = -3.13  | -1.01<br>t = -1.63   | $-1.68^{**}$<br>t = -2.02       |
| I(V5 *ECON)                 |                                 |                           |                             |                             |                                |                                | $2.39 \\ t = 1.66$          |  | $1.69 \\ t = 1.41$              |
| Observations $\mathbb{R}^2$ | 60<br>0                         | $59 \\ 0.01$              | $59 \\ 0.03$                | $59 \\ 0.06$                | 59<br>0.09                     | 59<br>0.29                     | 59<br>0.33                  | $\begin{array}{c} 59 \\ 0.16 \end{array}$                    | $59 \\ 0.18$                    |

Note:



\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

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#### Conclusion

- Using data on national election outcomes (western democracies), party manifestos and financial options, we find that:
  - 1) The electoral success of populist parties directly translates into higher option prices that protect against unfavorable financial market developments spanning the election period
  - 2) Taking ideology into account, we find that mostly left-wing populism explains these results.





#### ... very much for your attention and any (potential) comments you might have!



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#### **Exact measurement of political uncertainty**



- Implied volatility differences as in graphics
- 20-day averages
- ATM options (0.4 < |Delta|<0.5)
- Positive open interest
- $\overline{IV}_b = Mean(IV_{t,exp=b} | t \in [\tau 20, \tau 1])$

$$- \overline{IVD}_{\tau} = \overline{IV}_b - 1/2(\overline{IV}_a - \overline{IV}_c)$$

- Option definition:
  - Index options for major countries stock index or when no options traded/data available – options traded on countries MSCI index
  - Source: Refinitiv Datastream (formerly Thomson Reuters) and Optionmetrics Ivy DB US





#### **Table of Option Data Used**

#### Table 3: Country specific Option and Market Data.

This table gives information on the markets and the option samples used. For each country, we report the major stock index underlying our major option data source (Datastream, DS in Column 2), the corresponding DS mnemonic (Column 4) and the first appearance of data in the database (Column 5). Additionally we give the name of the alternative source of option information from WRDS (the countries' MSCI indices in Column 3), the WRDS Security ID (Column 6) and the first appearance of option data in this database (Column 7). Table 2 gives more information on the composition of the sample.

| Country        | Major Stock Index | DS Option Underlying | WRDS Option Underlying | DS Option Data Start | WRDS Secid | WRDS Option Data Start |
|----------------|-------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|------------|------------------------|
| Austria        | ATX               | ATXINDX              | NA                     | 2014-01-01           | NA         | NA                     |
| Australia      | ASX200            | ASX200I              | MSCI AUSTRALIA         | 2010-01-01           | 106413     | 2007-01-29             |
| Belgium        | BEL20             | BGBEL20              | MSCI BELGIUM           | 2011-01-01           | 106415     | 2013-09-18             |
| Brazil         | Ibovespa          | BRBOVES              | MSCI BRAZIL            | 2011-01-01           | 106416     | 2006-05-25             |
| Canada         | TSX 60            | TTOSP60              | MSCI CDA ETF           | 2008-01-01           | 106417     | 2006-03-02             |
| Denmark        | OMXC20            | COSE20C              | NA                     | 2012-01-01           | NA         | NA                     |
| Finland        | OMXH25            | HEX25IN              | NA                     | 2006-01-01           | NA         | NA                     |
| France         | CAC40             | FRCAC40              | MSCI FRANCE            | 2006-01-01           | 106421     | 2011-08-10             |
| Germany        | DAX               | XETRDAX              | MSCI GERMANY           | 2006-01-01           | 106427     | 2006-11-22             |
| Greece         | Athex20           | FTASE20              | NA                     | 2013-01-01           | NA         | NA                     |
| India          | Nifty50           | INNSE50              | MSCI INDIA             | 2010-01-01           | 188502     | 2011-02-08             |
| Italy          | FTSE MIB          | FTSEMIB              | MSCI ITALY             | 2007-01-01           | 106432     | 2010-07-13             |
| Japan          | Nikkei25          | JAPDOWA              | MSCI JAPAN             | 2007-01-01           | 106431     | 2005-10-10             |
| South Korea    | Kospi             | KOR200I              | MSCI S KOREA           | 2009-01-01           | 106426     | 2007-07-11             |
| Mexico         | IPC               | U:EWW                | MSCI MEXICO            | 2011-01-01           | 106429     | 2007-11-29             |
| Netherlands    | AEX               | AMSTEOE              | MSCI NETHERLANDS       | 2006-01-01           | 106428     | 2013-08-14             |
| Norway         | OSLO OBX          | OSLOOBX              | NA                     | 2010-01-01           | NA         | NA                     |
| Poland         | WIG20             | POLWG20              | MSCI POLAND CAP        | 2013-01-01           | 142980     | 2017-09-11             |
| Portugal       | PSI20             | POPSI20              | NA                     | 2016-01-01           | NA         | NA                     |
| Singapore      | STRAITS           | U:EWS                | MSCI SINGAPORE         | 2011-01-01           | 106419     | 2009-11-18             |
| South Africa   | FTSE              | U:EZA                | MSCI STH AFRCA         | 2009-01-01           | 116785     | 2007-05-24             |
| Spain          | IBEX35            | IBEX35I              | MSCI SPAIN             | 2007-01-01           | 106425     | 2007-06-21             |
| Sweden         | OMXS30            | SWEDOMX              | NA                     | 2007-01-01           | NA         | NA                     |
| Switzerland    | SMI               | SWISSMI              | NA                     | 2006-01-01           | NA         | NA                     |
| Taiwan         | TAIEX             | TAIWGHT              | MSCI TAIWAN            | 2010-01-01           | 106422     | 2006-03-09             |
| Turkey         | XU100             | TKNAT30              | MSCI TURKEY ETF        | 2016-01-01           | 138304     | 2013-06-24             |
| United Kingdom | FTSE100           | FTSE100              | MSCI UK ETF            | 2006-01-01           | 106420     | 2006-05-12             |
| United States  | S&P500            | S&PCOMP              | S&P500                 | 2006-01-01           | 108105     | 1996-01-04             |



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Back

#### **Table of Election Data Used**

#### Table 2: Table of Elections and data availability.

This table lists all national elections for which option and/or populism data according to Section 2 is available. More in detail, we list country, election date, whether sufficient option data to calculate our Measure of Political Uncertainty is available (column 'Options') and which source it comes from according to (column 'Option Source', see Section ??) and whether populism data according to Section 2.1 is available for that election.

| Country     | Date       | Options | Option Source | Populism | Country        | Date       | Options | Option Source | Populism |
|-------------|------------|---------|---------------|----------|----------------|------------|---------|---------------|----------|
| Australia   | 2007-11-24 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     | Netherlands    | 2012-09-12 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     |
| Australia   | 2010-08-21 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | Netherlands    | 2017-03-15 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     |
| Australia   | 2013-09-07 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | New Zealand    | 2014-09-20 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     |
| Australia   | 2016-07-02 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     | Norway         | 2013-09-09 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     |
| Belgium     | 2014-05-25 | TRUE    | DS            | FALSE    | Norway         | 2017-09-11 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     |
| Canada      | 2008-10-14 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     | Poland         | 2015-10-25 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     |
| Canada      | 2011-05-02 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | South Africa   | 2009-04-22 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     |
| Canada      | 2015-10-19 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | South Africa   | 2014-05-07 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     |
| Denmark     | 2015-06-18 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | South Korea    | 2008-04-09 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     |
| Finland     | 2007-03-18 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | South Korea    | 2012-04-11 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     |
| France      | 2007-06-17 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | Spain          | 2008-03-09 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     |
| France      | 2012-06-17 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | Spain          | 2011-11-20 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     |
| France      | 2017-06-18 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     | Spain          | 2015-12-20 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     |
| Germany     | 2009-09-27 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     | Spain          | 2016-06-26 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     |
| Germany     | 2013-09-22 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     | Sweden         | 2010-09-19 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     |
| Germany     | 2017-09-24 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     | Sweden         | 2014-09-14 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     |
| Greece      | 2015-01-25 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | Switzerland    | 2007-10-21 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     |
| Greece      | 2015-09-20 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | Switzerland    | 2011-10-23 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     |
| Italy       | 2008-04-13 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | Switzerland    | 2015-10-18 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     |
| Italy       | 2013-02-25 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | Turkey         | 2015-06-07 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     |
| Italy       | 2018-03-04 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | Turkey         | 2015-11-01 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     |
| Japan       | 2009-08-30 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     | United Kingdom | 2010-05-06 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     |
| Japan       | 2012-12-16 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | United Kingdom | 2015-05-07 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     |
| Japan       | 2014-12-14 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | United Kingdom | 2017-06-08 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     |
| Japan       | 2017-10-22 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | United States  | 1996-11-05 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     |
| Mexico      | 2009-07-05 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     | United States  | 2000-11-07 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     |
| Mexico      | 2012-07-01 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | United States  | 2004-11-02 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     |
| Mexico      | 2015-06-07 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | United States  | 2008-11-04 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     |
| Netherlands | 2006-11-22 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | United States  | 2012-11-06 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     |
| Netherlands | 2010-06-09 | TRUE    | DS            | TRUE     | United States  | 2016-11-08 | TRUE    | WRDS          | TRUE     |



#### **Manifesto variables**

| -<br>i<br>1<br>1<br>1 | Anti-<br>imperialism<br>Internationalism:<br>Negative<br>European<br>Union: Negative | Negative references to imperial behavior and/or negative references to one state exerting strong influence (political, military or commercial) over other states.<br>Negative references to international co-operation. Favorable mentions of national independence and sovereignty with regard to the manifesto country's foreign policy, isolation and/or unilateralism as opposed to internationalism.<br>Negative references to the European Community/Union. |
|-----------------------|--|---|
| :<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>] | Internationalism:<br>Negative<br>European<br>Union: Negative                         | Negative references to international co-operation. Favorable mentions of national independence and sovereignty with regard to the manifesto country's foreign policy, isolation and/or unilateralism as opposed to internationalism.<br>Negative references to the European Community/Union.  |
| 1<br>1<br>]           | European<br>Union: Negative  | Negative references to the European Community/Union.  |
| ]                     | 0  |   |
|                       | Democracy  | Favorable mentions of democracy as the 'only game in town'. General support for the manifesto country's democracy.  |
|                       | Governmental<br>and<br>Administrative<br>Efficiency                                  | Need for efficiency and economy in government and administration and/or the general appeal to make the process of government and administration cheaper and more efficient.   |
|                       | Political<br>Corruption  | Need to eliminate political corruption and associated abuses of political and/or bureaucratic power.<br>Need to abolish clientelist structures and practices.   |
| •                     | Political<br>Authority   | References to the manifesto party's competence to govern and/or other party's lack of such competence. Also includes favorable mentions of the desirability of a strong and/or stable government in general.  |
| ]<br>]                | Law and Order:<br>Positive   | Favorable mentions of strict law enforcement, and tougher actions against domestic crime. Only refers to the enforcement of the status quo of the manifesto country's law code.   |
| ft                    | Welfare State<br>Expansion   | Favorable mentions of need to introduce, maintain, or expand any public social service or social security scheme.   |
| Le                    | Labor Groups:<br>Positive  | Favorable references to all labor groups, the working class, and un-employed workers in general.<br>Support for trade unions and calls for the good treatment of all employees.   |
| bh                    | National Way of<br>Life: Positive  | Favorable mentions of the manifesto country's nation, history, and general appeals.   |
| Rig                   | Multiculturalism:<br>Negative  | The enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration. Appeals for cultural homogeneity in society.  |

S. Stöckl & M. Rode

31

# Zoom: Populism around the most recent elections

